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Anarchism, Individualism and Communism: William Morris’s Critique of Anarcho-
communism 
Ruth Kinna 
Introduction 
William Morris’s commitment to revolutionary socialism is now well established, but the 
nature of his politics, specifically his relationship to Marxism and anarchist thought, is still 
contested. Perhaps, as Mark Bevir has argued, the ideological label pinned to Morris’s 
socialism is of ‘little importance’ for as long as his political thought is described adequately. 
Nevertheless, the starting point for this essay is that thinking about the application of 
ideological descriptors is a useful exercise and one which sheds important light on Morris’s 
socialism and the process of ideological formation in the late nineteenth-century socialist 
movement. Bevir is surely right when he says that ‘ideologies are not mutually exclusive, 
reified entities’ but ‘overlapping traditions with ill-defined boundaries’.<xen>1</xen> Yet the 
struggle to reify these boundaries in a messy political world is a dominant feature in the 
history of the Left and one in which Morris was not afraid to engage. Indeed, towards the end 
of his life he made a concerted attempt to draw an ideological boundary between his 
preferred form of revolutionary socialism and anarchism. This not only makes him an 
interesting subject for the analysis of Marxist–anarchist relations, it also raises questions 
about the adequacy of the familiar charge that anarchism is both inherently individualistic 
and, as a consequence, ill-equipped to develop a coherent approach to democratic decision-
making. 
Morris defined his ideological position between 1883 and 1885 and called himself a 
communist. In 1890, when he withdrew from the Socialist League and established the 
Hammersmith Socialist Society he described this position negatively: neither state socialist 
nor anarchist.<xen>2</xen> In adopting this formulation Morris did not mean to suggest that 
he straddled these two ideological poles. Rather he wanted to indicate his independence from 
both. However, in 1893–1894 he repositioned himself once more, representing communism 
as a rejection of anarchism. His claim, that anarchists were individualists, was a recurrent 
charge in the non-anarchist socialist press, but Morris was an unusual critic of anarchism 
because he was sensitive to the different currents that ran through anarchist and individualist 
thought. Moreover, his late application of the individualist tag was extended to include 
anarchists with whom he had worked most closely: anarchist communists. Coming from him, 
the charge appears as an obvious reduction that grouped together a set of ideas that were 
based on very different, not always compatible, political, economic and ethical principles. 
The undiscriminating and angry tone of his critique can be explained by his rejection of the 
political violence of the late nineteenth century, a tactic that seemed all the more futile once 
Morris had acknowledged the failure of the anti-parliamentary revolutionary strategy he had 
adopted in the 1880s. He developed the theoretical justification for the critique in a 
discussion of the limits of freedom and individual–community relations.<xen>3</xen> This 
discussion drew on concepts of slavery, tyranny and mastership that he had elaborated in the 
1880s. Morris’s claim was that anarchism wrongly denied limits to freedom and that it was 
therefore socially disintegrative: individualist. The fatal flaw of anarchism was illustrated, he 
further suggested, by the inability of anarchists to show how individuals might enter into a 
process of decision-making and, therefore, to develop any practical socialist alternative. 
Unfortunately for Morris, this argument revealed that the ideological divide he sought to 
establish – between communism and anarchism – could be sustained only by his adoption of 
a model of decision-making that ran counter to his own radical principles of mastership and 
tyranny because it demanded the identification of democracy with the subordination of 
individual to class interests. 
The argument is developed in three sections. The first discusses Morris’s late critique of 
anarchist communism and his treatment of this strain of anarchism as a generic form. It 
examines his motivations and sets out the key concepts on which he later relied to develop his 
analysis of decision-making. The relationship between anarchism and individualism is 
discussed in the middle section, both in order to contextualise Morris’s understanding of 
these terms and to demonstrate how his awareness of anarchist and individualist politics gave 
way to the narrower system of ideological classification. His attempt to demonstrate how the 
inherent individualism of anarcho-communism ruled against collective agreement is the 
subject of the concluding part. It should become clear that the conjunction of anarchism and 
individualism that Morris sought to cement is dubious and that the boundaries between 
socialist traditions are more porous than he wanted to admit. 
Morris’s critique of anarchism 
On 1 May 1893 leading members of the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society 
and Morris’s Hammersmith Socialist Society issued the Manifesto of English Socialists. This 
document, to which Morris was a signatory, was intended to outline ‘the main principles and 
broad strategy on which … all Socialists may combine to act with vigour’ and it called on 
socialists to ‘sink their individual crochets in a business-like endeavour to realise in our own 
day that complete communization of industry for which the economic forms are ready and the 
minds of the people are almost prepared’.<xen>4</xen> Notwithstanding its apparent 
inclusiveness, the Manifesto specified the limits of socialist co-operation: 
… we must repudiate both the doctrines and tactics of Anarchism. As Socialists we 
believe that those doctrines and tactics necessarily resulting from them, though 
advocated as revolutionary by men who are honest and single-minded, are really 
reactionary both in theory and practice, and tend to check the advance of our cause. 
Indeed, so far from hampering the freedom of the individual, as Anarchists hold it 
will, Socialism will foster that full freedom which Anarchism would inevitably 
destroy.<xen>5</xen> 
Morris’s willingness to put his name to the Manifesto was not entirely surprising: the 
deterioration of his relationship with the anarchists in the Socialist League, which eventually 
forced his withdrawal from the party and the editorship of Commonweal, the League’s paper, 
helped explain the gradual but increasing hardening of his attitude. He had already voiced 
misgivings about anarchism in News From Nowhere and in the year following the publication 
of the Manifesto this light ridiculing turned into uncompromising rejection. In 1894 two 
important articles appeared. The first was an interview, ‘A Socialist Poet on Bombs and 
Anarchism’, published at the start of the year in Justice, the journal of the Social Democratic 
Federation. The second, an essay entitled ‘Why I am a Communist’, appeared in James 
Tochatti’s anarchist paper Liberty the following month. Morris made two claims: that 
anarchism was an individualist doctrine and that its individualism was reflected in the recent 
and unacceptable turn to political violence. 
His critique of anarchist individualism focused on two points, what Stefan Collini identifies 
as its methodological and moral principles. These were often used to support a politics of 
individualism, but were not necessarily presupposed by it.<xen>6</xen> Morris’s objection 
to methodological individualism was that it was impossible to make sense of individual 
behaviours by abstracting individuals from their social context. The moral principle, which he 
tied to it, was that that the communal bonds that he believed essential to individual 
flourishing, were wrongly represented by individualists as only so many potential constraints. 
Anarchism, he argued, embraced both ideas and the two articles that he published in 1894 
advanced this case. 
In Justice Morris argued: ‘man is unthinkable outside society. Man cannot live or move 
outside it. This negation of society is the position taken up by the logical Anarchists 
…’.<xen>7</xen> In ‘Why I am a Communist’ he reiterated the point. One of the distinctive 
features of the communist position, he argued, is the conviction that ‘mankind is not 
thinkable outside of Society’.<xen>8</xen> In contrast, ‘Anarchism, as a theory, negatives 
society, and puts man outside it’. Although Morris accepted that anarchists like Kropotkin, 
who he knew quite well, were not in fact ‘against society altogether’,<xen>9</xen> having 
once granted this exception he refused to acknowledge that anarcho-communism described a 
coherent politics. This term, he argued, was a ‘flat contradiction’: ‘In so far as they are 
Communists they must give up their Anarchism’ because anarchism ‘is purely destructive, 
purely negatory’. Comrades like Kropotkin who called themselves anarchists were deluded, 
Morris argued. They ‘cannot be Anarchists in the true sense of the word’.<xen>10</xen> 
Morris’s understanding of moral individualism was underpinned by the interrelated concepts 
of ‘tyranny’, ‘slavery’, ‘mastership’ and ‘fellowship’. Perhaps ill-advisedly using tyranny to 
describe the nature of social existence, he reasoned that because individuals could not be 
understood in the abstract and must always be considered as members of particular 
communities, they were always necessarily constrained by social arrangements. Tyranny was 
thus an unavoidable feature of all social life. Naturally, Morris recognised that social tyranny 
could take different forms and that it was not necessarily empowering or benign. In other 
words, some social systems were also tyrannical. The distinction Morris made was between 
‘true’ and ‘false’ or ‘arbitrary’ society. Commercial society plainly fell in the latter category, 
since here social relations were based on class coercion, or what Morris called ‘force’ and 
‘fraud’. In socialism, tyranny would assume ‘true’ form. This was the position Morris 
outlined in the Statement of Principles of the Hammersmith Socialist Society: 
For here we must say that it is not the dissolution of society for which we strive, but 
its reintegration. The idea put forward by some who attack present society, of the 
complete independence of every individual, that is, for freedom without society, is not 
merely impossible of realization, but, when looked into, turns out to be 
inconceivable.<xen>11</xen> 
The goal of revolutionaries, Morris argued, was to rid society of slavery rather than tyranny, 
since when slavery was abolished tyranny’s tyrannical features would also disappear. As 
Susan Buck-Morss notes ‘slavery had become the root metaphor of Western political 
philosophy’ by the eighteenth century, ‘connoting everything that was evil about power 
relations’.<xen>12</xen> Morris appeared to follow this convention and defined slavery as a 
relation based on compulsion, rooted in nature and institutionalised in economic power. In 
nature, he argued, all life was enslaved by the necessity of labour. The stark choice was to 
work or perish. In human societies, nature’s compulsion was overlaid by secondary systems 
of enslavement. These could take different forms but Morris believed that each historical type 
reflected the attempt of a minority to escape the force of nature and the dictates of labour, and 
he argued that the differences between them were irrelevant to their classification. Bond-
slavery, feudalism and wage-labour were not moral equivalents but they all enabled the elite 
to live from the labour of others and stripped those charged with the burden of labour of 
effective choice in production. This group were thus doubly enslaved. 
Morris applied the same reasoning to women, yet he argued that there was a difference 
between labour and the way that slavery operated in this context. Women were dependent on 
men as well as slaves to capitalism, and they were therefore triply enslaved. Even accepting 
that there was ‘the closest of relations between the prostitution of the body in the streets and 
of the body in the workshops’,<xen>13</xen> he concluded that the liberation of women 
required a social as well as an economic change: dependence on men in addition to the 
abolition of capitalism and, above all, the abolition of bourgeois marriage laws which 
enshrined the power relations that compelled women to prostitute themselves for the sake of 
economic security, controlling their reproduction in addition to their labour. 
Tyrannical societies (that is, those based on slavery) operated through mastership. In The 
Dream of John Ball, a story of the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt, Morris tells the eponymous hero of 
the story that 
men shall yet have masters over them who have at hand many a law and custom for 
the behoof of masters, and being master can make yet more laws in the same behoof; 
and they shall suffer poor people to thrive just so long as their thriving shall profit the 
mastership and no longer.<xen>14</xen> 
Mastership blinded individuals to their exploitation by masking naked greed with false ideas 
of duty, natural hierarchy and political obligation. John Ball tells his listeners: ‘sooth it is that 
the poor deemeth the rich to be other than he, and meet to be his master, as though, forsooth, 
the poor were come of Adam, and the rich of him that made Adam, that is 
God’.<xen>15</xen> Yet in principle, Morris associated mastership with wilfulness and was 
more concerned with its location than its existence. As one of the fictional characters of his 
prose romances says: ‘ “So it is then the world over, that happy men are wilful and 
masterful.” ’<xen>16</xen> The same idea is expressed by the fourteenth-century peasants. 
Morris observes how the artisans sing a song ‘concerning the struggle against tyranny for the 
freedom of life … of the life of a man doing his own will and not the will of another man 
commanding him for the commandment’s sake’.<xen>17</xen> The promise of mastership 
was that it could be recovered by and devolved to individuals, so that instead of satisfying 
another’s will each was able to realise their own. Structurally, this demanded economic 
equality (which Morris defined as a principle of distribution according to need), an end to 
both the artificial hierarchies that facilitated slavery and the compulsion that forced labour. 
Yet none of these conditions released individuals from the duties and obligations that unjust, 
tyrannical societies perverted. In just social conditions, these obligations and duties would 
persist. 
In a future communist society, Morris anticipated duty and obligation transformed. As 
masters, individuals exercised their own will but they did so co-operatively or, as Morris put 
it, in fellowship. Although he did not pinpoint precisely what he meant by this concept, he 
captured the essence of the social relations he desired in his discussions of art. His principle 
assumption was that the democratisation of art in communism would free individuals by 
transforming work.<xen>18</xen> As artists, individuals would meet their essential needs by 
engaging in productive leisure. Working voluntarily, they would no longer perceive labour as 
compulsion but instead as pleasure. However, the freedom they experienced as artists would 
meet a communal as well as an individual need. As Morris explained to James Tochatti in 
1894, in communism artists ‘will work for the benefit of … the whole people: whereas now 
they work for the masters, the rich class, that lives on the labour of others’.<xen>19</xen> 
Free to do what they willed, individuals would produce things that were thought to be 
‘beautiful and pleasant’ and which they hoped would give pleasure to others. They would 
have full scope for creative expression – mastership – but would find meaning for their art in 
fellowship. In the true sense, Morris argued, art was impossible, 
except by means of the co-operation of labour that produces the ordinary wares of 
life; and that co-operation again they cannot have as long as the workmen are 
dependent on the will of a master. They must co-operate consciously and willingly for 
the expression of individual character and gifts which we call art.<xen>20</xen> 
While the theoretical weakness that Morris eventually identified in anarchism rested on the 
claim that individualism ruled against the possibility of co-operation and collective 
agreement, his late critique also fastened on what he considered to be the practical 
implications of the anarchists’ individualist stance. His charge was that because anarchists 
failed to understand that individuality must issue from, or in tandem with co-operation, their 
individualism played itself out in violence. Evidence to support the charge was readily 
available. In the early 1890s a series of trials provided a platform for anarchists accused of 
committing a range of high-profile assassinations and bombings to justify the use of violence 
as a revolutionary tactic. In his interview for Justice, Morris referred to some of the more 
notorious characters involved, notably Ravachol and Vaillant. His complaint against them 
was two-fold: insofar as their acts involved the targeting of ‘non-combatants’ they were 
immoral and as a revolutionary strategy violence was futile. Quite a lot of anarchists – 
including Kropotkin – agreed. Yet Morris appeared to draw the arguments together to suggest 
that the anarchists’ lack of feasible alternative highlighted a lack of constraint that was 
implicit in their individualism. 
His view was mediated by a longer reflection about the prospects for revolution. During the 
whole period of his active involvement in socialism (1883–1896) Morris’s expectations about 
revolution altered considerably and his relationship with anarchism varied in turn. His 
warmest relations with the anarchists coincided with a period of optimism in the mid- to late 
1880s when he combined a commitment to ‘making socialists’ with a policy of anti-
parliamentarism, in preparation for the anticipated collapse of capitalism. His sympathies 
began to wane after 1887 when the disaster of Bloody Sunday (a mass demonstration in 
London’s Trafalgar Square which met with extraordinary police violence, leaving three dead 
and hundreds injured) gave him a glimpse of the sheer might of the state’s reactionary force. 
No longer sanguine about the willingness or capability of the workers to immediately 
confront or resist it, Morris became convinced that his efforts to make socialists through anti-
parliamentary activity were hopeless and that the strategy would likely end in disaster. By the 
early 1890s his criticisms of anarchism became more strident as he reluctantly reconciled 
himself to the idea that parliament offered the only available route to change.<xen>21</xen> 
Having taken stock of the reality of class struggle, he tired of talk of revolution and felt that 
those who indulged in such arguments were deluded. 
Morris’s reassessment of revolution not only coincided with the wave of political violence 
explicitly associated with anarchism but, equally importantly, with its enthusiastic embrace 
by self-identifying anarchists in the League. At precisely the point that Morris accepted 
parliamentarism as the only available route to socialist change, some League anarchists found 
their inspiration in assassination and random killing and adopted a rhetoric of revolutionary 
violence that filled him with frustration and despair. Although he continued to offer financial 
support to former comrades who fell foul of the incitement laws and agent provocateurs, the 
co-operation he had once enjoyed with anarchists both in an out of the League as an anti-
parliamentarian gave way to a deep hostility. When James Tochatti first requested a statement 
of his politics in Liberty, Morris told him that he could not ‘in conscience’ allow his name to 
be ‘attached’ to an ‘anarchist paper’ because of the ‘promiscuous slaughter’ which anarchists 
had adopted as ‘a means of converting people’.<xen>22</xen> The significance of this 
reappraisal was not missed by observers. One anonymous anarchist correspondent to Liberty 
wrote that Morris now counter-posed violence to political action as if there were no other 
possibility, a view that wrongly dismissed the revolutionary potential of ‘trade combinations’ 
and of waging precisely the kind of extra-parliamentary struggle that he outlined in the 
chapter ‘how the change came’ in News From Nowhere.<xen>23</xen> Having put his name 
to the Manifesto, Morris appeared to be persuaded that there were only two routes to 
socialism: parliament or terror. Even if the former was likely to lead to a type of socialism 
that he did not like, the refusal of all anarchists to accept it and the willingness of some to 
choose terror indicated the extent of their individualism. Only those who prioritised this 
concept above all others would fail to see the necessity of supporting the collective struggle 
or perform blatantly immoral acts that ran counter to ordinary political calculations. 
As individualists, Morris concluded, anarchists were not prone to violence as such, but to 
assertive and transgressive behaviours which might be expressed violently and which were at 
root, anti-social. Taking August Vaillant (the anarchist executed in 1894 for throwing a bomb 
into the French Chamber of Deputies) as his model, Morris linked individualism to vain-
gloriousness. 
Prepared to sacrifice his life in order to gratify his vanity; he is a type of men [sic] you 
meet in all grades all professions. You and I have met some of them; even among 
artists and poets they are not unknown; men who would do, in their art, what they 
knew to be quite wrong and outrageous in order to gain notoriety rather than work 
honesty and well and remain in obscurity.<xen>24</xen> 
In Morris’s mind, anarchists like Vaillant were artists of a particular stripe. Failing to 
understand their social obligations and duties, they denied fellowship and so wrongly 
interpreted mastership as a principle of individual domination. Morris found another model of 
this brand of individualism in capitalism and in the experimentation of elite art where, what 
passed as creativity was increasingly driven by the desire to secure a niche in the market 
through notoriety: false claims to ‘originality’ fuelled by ‘competition for the guineas of the 
Manchester patron’.<xen>25</xen> In this competitive environment ‘everybody must at least 
pretend to be a master: for, look you, it no longer pays an artist to work hard to correct the 
faults which he himself cannot fail to recognize’.<xen>26</xen> This analysis tapped into 
discussions of decadence, which as Regenia Gagnier shows, cut across late Victorian literary, 
political and scientific fields.<xen>27</xen> Although it was clear that individualism in the 
arts represented a different level of attention-seeking to assassination and terror, Morris was 
not alone in thinking that it came from the same root and that it expressed a similar 
anarchistic distain for social engagement, co-operation and mutual support as well as 
integrity and self-reflection. 
To summarise: Morris’s attempt to classify all anarchists as individualist appeared to 
establish a clear ideological boundary between anarchism and communism. Violence was 
symptomatic of this division, but it was rooted in an understanding of individual–community 
relations that Morris derived from his concepts of fellowship, mastership and tyranny: a 
social condition of co-operative interdependence, supported by economic equality. Morris’s 
position was certainly clear, yet as an accurate description of ideological difference it was 
deeply flawed. The sweep of his late designation of anarchist thought was muddied by the 
complexity of political debate and the contestation of both of his central terms: ‘anarchism’ 
and ‘individualism’. As will be seen below, these terms were used to describe free market 
anti-statism at one end of the spectrum and the anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarianism of 
Bakunin and Kropotkin at the other. Morris directed his critique at both, but his blanket 
rejection of anarchism assumed a questionable conflation that was belied by divisions within 
Victorian individualism and the anarchist movement itself. 
Anarchisms and individualisms: from politics to ideology 
Individualism was a central term in late Victorian political debate and disagreements about 
the role of the state, in particular, were conceptualised in terms of its opposition to 
collectivism.<xen>28</xen> In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century revolutionary 
socialist circles this debate took a distinctive turn. Revolutionaries also probed the rights and 
wrongs of state intervention – the delivery of welfare services, questions of individual rights 
and responsibilities – but looked as well at the state’s class composition, its transformative 
potential, its ethical status and long-term existence. These interests affected the ways in 
which key terms of debate were couched. For example, socialists did not so much use 
collectivism as a synonym for socialism, as was the habit of anti-collectivists, but to describe 
a commitment to a principle of common ownership which could be interpreted either to mean 
centralised state ownership, decentralised communal and/or direct workers’ control. The goal 
of revolution was usually described in other ways: socialism, communism, mutualism, 
anarchy, the co-operative commonwealth, and sometimes democratic socialism and, 
pejoratively, state socialism. Anarchists sometimes defined ‘collectivism’ even more 
narrowly, to describe the principle of distribution according to work – or deeds – as opposed 
to the communist system of needs. Kropotkin’s adoption of this usage enabled him to gloss 
over his differences with Bakunin while also disputing the claim that Marx was a 
communist.<xen>29</xen> 
Naturally, discussions conducted in the anti-collectivist circles had an impact on socialist 
debates and on perceptions of anarchism in particular. The pre-eminent position that Herbert 
Spencer occupied in the individualist camp meant that individualism was habitually 
associated with anti-statism, opening the way for anarchism to be linked to the defence of the 
free market, the economic doctrine that socialists typically mapped to individualist political 
theory. In the Liberty and Property Defence League (LPDL), a Spencerite organisation whose 
co-authored manifesto A Plea For Liberty was published in 1891, all these relationships were 
examined. Auberon Herbert, one of the group’s leading lights called himself a ‘voluntaryist’, 
a stance which combined resistance to the state, ‘the great machine’ as Herbert called it, and 
the ‘many systems of State force’ with recognition of the ‘free and open market’. His political 
ideal was one which released the ‘living energies of the free individuals’ and left them 
free to combine in their own way, in their own groups, finding their own experience, 
setting before themselves their own hopes and desires, aiming only at such ends as 
they truly share in common, and ever as the foundation of it all, respecting deeply and 
religiously alike their own freedom, and the freedom of all others.<xen>30</xen> 
Herbert rejected the label anarchist because he supported a system of regulation to ‘repress 
aggression or crime’<xen>31</xen> but other members of the LPDL – notably J. H. Levy – 
did not and in embracing it further blurred the boundaries between different anarchisms. 
Dividing anarchists into three camps – ‘conservative’, ‘communist’ and ‘individualist’ – he 
acknowledged that communism occupied the main ground of the movement, but argued that 
none of the factions could claim exclusive rights over its application. Moreover, the generic 
use of the term ‘anarchist’ did not worry him since he believed that there was an important 
family resemblance between these varieties. United in their opposition to ‘coercive co-
operation’ or government – what he called socialism – anarchists differed only on the 
structural mechanisms required to achieve their aims: whether to maintain full rights of 
ownership, abolish property rights or allow property in use.<xen>32</xen> The secretary of 
the LPDL, Wordsworth Donnisthorpe, took yet another approach. At first resisting the label, 
he later identified himself as an anarchist because he believed that anti-statists were more 
interested in defending privilege by entrenching market advantage in monopoly than in 
genuinely expanding the sphere of liberty. According to Wendy McElroy, he was steered in 
this direction by Benjamin Tucker, having been for many years a correspondent to Liberty 
and the paper’s most frequent British contributor.<xen>33</xen> 
Outside the LPDL, anarchist opinion about the proper designation of anti-collectivist 
individualism was similarly divided. For Max Nettlau, an associate of Kropotkin, Herbert’s 
voluntaryism was ‘humane and vigorously anti-statist’ but ultimately dilettante and not 
‘anarchist’.<xen>34</xen> In contrast, Tucker described Herbert as a true 
anarchist.<xen>35</xen> Victor Yarros, an associate of Tucker, made the same claims for 
Levy.<xen>36</xen> These responses broadly mapped to sub-divisions between so-called 
individualist, egoist, mutualist and communist principles. As a rule of thumb, anarchists who 
put themselves in one of the first two groups tended to be more receptive to anti-collectivist 
individualism than mutualists or communists. Yet, as discussions within and between these 
groups show, anarchist conceptions of individualism were far more complex and messy. For 
example, notwithstanding the common ground that anarchist individualists sometimes found 
with anti-collectivists, anarcho-communists did not reject individualism out of hand. Indeed, 
while Kropotkin felt that Tucker’s Spencerite leanings ultimately pointed to the defence of a 
minimal state, he endorsed key tenets of his anti-statist critique. On Spencer’s death, 
Freedom, the anarchist paper Kropotkin helped establish, feted Spencer as ‘the greatest 
philosopher of the nineteenth century’. His two virtues were that he had ‘vigorously shaken 
the foundation stone of the idea of God, or authority and of superstition on which the power 
and privileges of the rich oppressors are based’ and that he had ‘denounced the State as a 
pernicious establishment bequeathed to us by the barbarians and strengthened by those idle 
and oppressing social classes living on the labour of the people’.<xen>37</xen> Kropotkin 
offered another appreciation, highlighting his common commitment to Spencer’s rationalism, 
love of naturalistic science and celebration of the idea that ‘the welfare of the individual’ was 
the single most important postulate of the social and physical sciences.<xen>38</xen> 
Spencer had shown that individuals had a capacity to reason, co-operate and develop social 
behaviours without compulsion and without recourse to religion or other metaphysical 
speculation. In this he had followed the tradition established by Proudhon. Anarchists, 
Kropotkin argued, endorsed both his analytical approach and his anti-statism. 
Anarchist communists were intolerant of anti-collectivist economics, however, and parted 
company equally with anti-collectivists and anarchist individualists on questions of property 
and exchange. Nettlau, together with another of Kropotkin’s comrades, Varlaam Tcherkesov, 
argued that these issues were the real determinants of individualist and non-individualist 
doctrines. Insofar as Nettlau and Tcherkesov’s arguments treated varieties of anarchism as 
mere ‘economic forms’ their understanding bore some relation to Levy’s.<xen>39</xen> The 
difference was that Levy’s Spencerite leanings led him to identify all anarchists (including 
communist) as individualists and anti-socialist, whereas Tcherkesov changed the ideological 
poles of debate to argue that individualism represented a deviation from a socialist-anarchist 
norm. By his reckoning, the division between anarchists and individualists was marked by the 
anarchist’s rejection of private ownership and the market. Thus placing ‘[Max] Sterner’ [sic] 
in the same category as Spencer, he dismissed both as ‘bourgeois’.<xen>40</xen> In 1893 
Freedom published a full statement of this view: 
Communist anarchists claim as the basis of the new social order common property, 
whereas Individualists defend private property as the necessary foundation of society 
… Nor is that the only difference between Communist and Individualist Anarchists. 
Communist Anarchists maintain that the necessary accompaniment of private 
property is government; a government of some kind, whether a parliamentary one, or 
a sort of East India Company, or a Pinkerton Police Force salaried by the capitalists. 
And as to the ‘voluntary’ taxation and other ‘voluntary’ things advocated by 
Individualists, we fail to see how, in a society based on private property and 
individual competition, the people who ‘voluntarily’ submit to a tax could be 
prevented from shifting the burden on to their neighbours; or how those who join in a 
Defence Association would be prevented from using this organized force against 
others than themselves.<xen>41</xen> 
Tying the anarchism to a particular politics rather than an economic form, mutualists 
challenged Tcherkesov’s anarchist–individualist dichotomy. Mutualism, they argued, was not 
a mere economic system, even if liberty of production, or the right of producers to determine 
how goods were to be distributed and disposed of, was central to it.<xen>42</xen> 
Importantly, mutualism differed from the anti-collectivist individualism associated with 
Herbert and Spencer, because it did not justify unlimited accumulation or authority through 
private property.<xen>43</xen> Some communists accepted the ethical distinction that the 
mutualists sought to make between their own position and unqualified anti-statism. As a 
correspondent to Freedom noted, plain individualism was Lockean: it described ‘the right of 
the individual to appropriate the result of other people’s labor over and above what he pays 
them in wages, though he generally has to share this surplus according to agreement with the 
usurer, landlord and government’.<xen>44</xen> Mutualism, by contrast, was egalitarian and 
it did not allow such appropriations. Treating mutualist claims seriously, these anarchists 
nevertheless criticised mutualists for calling themselves individualists because it wrongly 
implied ‘a tautology between Individualism and Anarchism’ and misleadingly conflated an 
agreement (between communists and mutualists) about ethics with a disagreement about the 
operation of markets.<xen>45</xen> Rejecting this implication, the anarcho-communists 
argued that they were as committed to individual freedom as the mutualists were and that 
communism was the only economic system capable of securing the liberties that both groups 
of anarchists cherished. Kropotkin made a similar point in a discussion of Proudhon and 
Stirner, but introduced a modification to the terms of debate. Proudhon, Kropotkin argued, 
understood correctly that moral conscience, by which he meant a conception of justice and 
equality, had a basis in social life. Stirner argued that morality existed only by convention 
and wrongly concluded that it was necessarily rooted in authority.<xen>46</xen> On this 
reading, mutualism described a system of anarchist ethics based on the principle of 
individuality; egoism, by contrast, was an individualist doctrine which sanctioned selfishness 
in the name of self-expression.<xen>47</xen> 
These were a complex set of debates and because they involved a range of individuals who 
assumed a number of different theoretical perspectives, there was little consensus about 
where or how to draw the lines of ideological division. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, 
outside observers sometimes simply passed over the complexity of anarchist politics and 
failed to acknowledge the different ways in which the relationship between anarchism and 
individualism was understood. For example, in a sweeping critique of a priori political 
philosophy, T. H. Huxley identified two important trends in the history of European thought: 
regimentation and anarchy. The first was defined by the view that ‘the blessings of peace’ 
required the surrender of rights to authority. In the modern period Hobbes stood at its head. 
The second, anarchy, typically treated individuals as ‘highly intelligent and respectable 
persons, “living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with 
authority to judge between them” ’.<xen>48</xen> This was the tradition of Locke. On this 
system of classification Auberon Herbert – who rejected the label – was as much an anarchist 
as Levy who was willing to accept it or, as Huxley in fact suggested, as Stirner and 
Bakunin.<xen>49</xen> Non-anarchist socialist critics tended to treat the divisions within the 
anarchist movement in an equally cavalier manner and even more mischievously. In 1893 
Freedom noted that social democrats usually ‘disposed’ of anarchism in one of three ways. 
One was to claim that it was ‘too perfect an ideal’ and utopian. Another was to suggest that 
anarchy was identical to the social democratic vision and that ‘anarchism and anarchy’ were 
just ‘bad neologisms’. The third was to argue that anarchism was ‘a return to barbarism … a 
new form of the old and discredited laissez-faire doctrine’, ‘reactionary’ to 
boot.<xen>50</xen> This last claim touched directly on the nature of anarchist individualism 
and it became one of the dominant themes in social democratic writing, not least because it 
was taken up at the turn of the century by Lenin.<xen>51</xen> Writing in 1896, William 
Liebkecht advanced precisely this case. On account of the influence that Stirner had exercised 
on the anti-socialist Eugene Richter (whose 1891 satire Pictures of a Socialistic Future 
mocked German social democracy as a hopelessly inefficient and frighteningly utopian 
tyranny), Liebkecht traced the origins of anarchism to Stirner and thus denounced it as an 
individualist doctrine.<xen>52</xen> While Stirner’s egoism was indeed open to individual 
property ownership, the elision of egoism with limited state doctrines and the extension of 
this combination to anarchism in general was – as Tcherkesov protested – highly misleading. 
Still, Liebkneckt argued: 
There is, in fact, nothing in common between Anarchism and Socialism. Anarchism 
… has individualism for its basis; that is, the same principle on which capitalist 
society rests, and therefore it is essentially reactionary, however hysterical may be its 
shrieks of revolution.<xen>53</xen> 
How did Morris approach these debates? The answer is that the view he expressed in 1893–
1894 was based on a classification equally reductive as Huxley’s and Liebkneckt’s. Yet it 
was unusual because it was also based on both a familiarity with the anarchist movement 
(that Huxley lacked) and a much closer and sympathetic involvement with anarchist politics 
than Liebkneckt had ever enjoyed. 
Morris’s diary for 1887 distinguished three groups. The first were what he called the 
‘orthodox’ anarchists who met at Cleveland Hall and he identified Victor Dave – with whom 
he and Belfort Bax co-wrote their history of the Paris Commune – as their ‘leading spirit’. 
The second were the anarchists of the Autonomy group and the third the Freedom group 
organised around Kropotkin and Charlotte Wilson. Morris was aware of these groups’ 
different constituencies. He noted, for example, that Dave’s ‘orthodox’ anarchists were 
fervent internationalists, largely French and German speaking refugees. A newspaper cutting 
from the Daily News pasted into his diary described Charlotte Wilson as a ‘South Kensington 
or British Museum art-student’ type, an ‘aesthete with views’, capturing an image of the 
Freedom group that was usually painted in less polite terms by the anarchists of the Socialist 
League.<xen>54</xen> 
Apart from noting their different meeting places and memberships, Morris seemed unsure of 
the issues that divided these groups. For example, he admitted ignorance of the grounds of 
the ‘quarrel’ – a spying scandal – which divided Dave’s anarchists from the Autonomy 
group, though later becoming involved in the affair, he designated the latter as 
‘unrespectable’.<xen>55</xen> Yet, as Florence Boos notes, Morris appreciated that there 
were significant divisions between ‘orthodox Anarchists’, ‘collectivists’ and Kropotkin’s 
anarcho-communists.<xen>56</xen> Moreover, he identified the distinctively communist 
position with the rejection of government, of parliamentarism and the characterisation of 
bourgeois politics as a condition of war – a most tyrannous tyranny. What Morris called the 
‘anarchical’ tendencies of Charlotte Wilson’s ‘Utopian Anarchist Superstition’ referred, 
additionally, to the communists’ unwavering faith in the latent power of spontaneous grass 
roots resistance, a faith which he did not share.<xen>57</xen> 
Morris’s observations of the anarchist movement hardly touched on the theoretical issues 
discussed in the anarchist press, but he was certainly familiar with the anti-collectivism of the 
LPDL. The text of a speech by Wordsworth Donnisthorpe, published in Henry Seymour’s 
paper The Anarchist, earned a scornful review in Commonweal in 1887.<xen>58</xen> 
Donnisthorpe’s critical dissection of the Socialist Catechism by Morris’s friend J. L. Joynes 
might well have influenced his judgement, but either way Morris described the speech as an 
example of the ‘pessimistic paradoxical exercises which are a disease of the period, and 
whose aim would seem to be the destruction of the language’.<xen>59</xen> Morris’s 
judgements of Auberon Herbert were hardly warmer. He had worked with Herbert in the 
Eastern Question Association in the 1870s, and thereafter followed debates about 
‘voluntaryism’ in the liberal reviews, but this personal association failed to encourage an 
appreciation of his ideas. The critique Grant Allen presented in the essay ‘Individualism and 
Socialism’ was too tame for Morris, but he agreed with Allen that the LPDL’s defence of 
property in use would result in the very monopoly that undercut the equal enjoyment of 
individual liberty the group championed.<xen>60</xen> As Morris put it: by supporting a 
principle of distribution according to deed, these anarchists ‘wished to abolish organised 
monopoly but supported unorganised monopoly, or the rule of the strongest individual … 
upholding … private property with no association’.<xen>61</xen> 
However confusing Morris found the internal politics of the anarchist movement, he was 
certainly familiar with some of the issues that divided anarchist communists from limited-
state anti-collectivists. Nevertheless, in his late critique of anarchism he subordinated these 
differences to capture both groups under the common principle of anti-authoritarianism. This 
approach to anarchism was well rehearsed in the non-anarchist socialist press, though 
Freedom’s commentary on social democratic objections to anarchism overlooked it. For 
example, finding agreement neither in ‘object, policy, nor methods’ with the anarchists, 
Justice argued that the anarchist, ‘will have no authority on any account’ and that ‘the Social-
Democrat believes that a certain amount of authority will always be 
necessary’.<xen>62</xen> Anarchist anti-authoritarianism was also central to Engels’ critique 
and, just as Liebkneckt used Stirner to link laissez-faire economics to anarchism, he drew on 
the same source to reveal the chaotic destructiveness of anarchist doctrines. Identifying 
Bakunin as the transmitter of ‘Stirnerian “rebellion” ’ he jibed: ‘the anarchists have all 
become “unique ones”, so unique that no two of them can agree with each 
other’.<xen>63</xen> Morris arrived at his position by a different route, fastening on 
collective agreement rather than abstract authority, but his claims were similar. He attempted 
to show that anarchist moral individualism rendered agreement in socialism impossible. His 
discussion drew back to the concepts he had elaborated in the 1880s: social tyranny, slavery 
and fellowship. Rejecting ‘social tyranny’, he contended, anarchists also denied fellowship, 
leaving individuals exposed to new forms of slavery, rooted in the unconfined principle of 
individual mastership. The difficulty of the charge was that it ran counter to a process of 
decision-making that Morris also supported, suggesting that the ideological reduction that he 
had distilled from his engagement with anarchist politics was perhaps faulty. 
Communism, anarchism and democracy 
Accusing the anarchists of being ‘somewhat authoritative’ on the issue, Morris argued that 
the individualism of the anarcho-communists was expressed through their rejection of 
collective agreement.<xen>64</xen> His starting point was that anarchists opposed 
agreement on the grounds that it gave power to majorities and was therefore coercive. For 
Morris, this argument was self-defeating. To illustrate why, he imagined a dispute about the 
building of a bridge. Should opinion be divided, he asked: ‘What is to be done? Which party 
is to give way?’ The anarchist answer, Morris thought, was to ‘say it must not be carried by a 
majority’; Morris responded, ‘in that case, then, it must be carried by a 
minority’.<xen>65</xen> The illogicality of the anarchist position pointed to an important 
theoretical principle: anarchists prioritised the rights of individuals over all forms of 
collective power. 
Failing to recognise that equal freedom necessarily involved a coercive limit on the liberty of 
all, anarchists not only tied themselves in knots on the question of majoritarianism, they also 
committed themselves to the negative moral individualism that genuine communism – 
Morris’s doctrine – rejected. To the anarcho-communist readers of the Commonweal Morris 
argued that ‘if freedom from authority means the assertion of the advisability or possibility of 
an individual man doing what he pleases always and under all circumstances, this is an 
absolute negation of society’.<xen>66</xen> No matter how much these anarchists openly 
disagreed with the ‘voluntaryists’ on questions of economics, they shared the same moral 
outlook.<xen>67</xen> 
The strength of Morris’s conclusion lay in his claim that the anarcho-communists in fact 
understood authority as he suggested. Yet as the debates about individualism make clear, this 
argument was difficult to sustain. Admittedly, the clearest statements of anarchist-communist 
ethics appeared only after Morris had died. However it was clear from discussions in 
Freedom that anarcho-communists were extremely wary of non-communist anarchist 
doctrines and their impact on individual–community relations. Two particular examples were 
that mutualism failed to provide adequate safeguards to protect the egalitarian relations it 
espoused and that egoism gave free reign to individual competition. Morris expressed 
precisely the same worry about ‘voluntaryism’ and the individualism of the LPDL. More 
tellingly, Morris’s further explorations of democracy suggested that the fault line that he 
identified between communism and anarcho-communism was not based on the presumed 
incompatibility of anti-authoritarianism with unrestrained individual freedom, at all. Indeed, 
he located the problem of individualism in the tension between anti-authoritarianism and 
class interest. This argument secured the ideological division he wanted to cement, but it did 
not sit easily with the model of decision-making that he presented in his utopian romance, 
News From Nowhere. 
Morris opened up the gap in the debate in his letter to the readers of Commonweal where he 
attempted to show how anarchist defences of liberty conflicted with the idea of a common 
good. He imagined two scenarios: one where the long-term stability of society was threatened 
by the rise of a tyrannous interest, for example, the attempt to reintroduce some form of 
slavery (like monopoly), and a second, short term dispute where opinions about a particular 
policy diverged. Both scenarios, he argued, legitimised coercion, but the legitimate tyranny 
assumed different forms. The first case, the threat of new enslavement, convinced Morris that 
there was a need for an organisation or a ‘central body’, at least for a temporary period, to 
enforce commitments to socialist principles.<xen>68</xen> The second dispute – the policy 
disagreement – did not demand this kind of regulatory body, but resolution depended on 
observance of socialist principles, or an idea of collective good. To illustrate, Morris 
imagined how a proposal to cut down ‘all the timber in England’ and turn the ‘country into 
… a market-garden under glass’ might be challenged. Opponents, he suggested, might prefer 
the landscape to remain wild and to preserve its natural beauty.<xen>69</xen> However, if 
the majority backed the proposal, it was only right that the imagined objectors (Morris put 
himself among them) subordinate their own interests to the general interest of the community. 
No matter how significant their differences might be – and the example Morris chose was 
designed to highlight how divisive he felt the issue was – the minority would ‘give up the 
lesser for the greater’.<xen>70</xen> 
On this account, Morris perceived communism to be anti-anarchist in two ways. On the one 
hand, the imagined central body institutionalised the social tyranny on which socialism 
depended, and on the other it gave priority to majority over minority or individual interests. 
Yet in 1894 he drew still further from anarchist thinking by adopting a position which relied 
on the recognition of a universal interest, not just the priority of the numeric majority. The 
pluralism which explained the policy disagreements that socialists were likely to face was 
now denied. Majority rule, he argued, ‘is only harmful where there is conflict of 
interest’.<xen>71</xen> In socialism, ‘there would be no opposition of interests, but only 
divergences of opinion’ because the ‘struggles between opposing interests for … mastery’, 
that were part and parcel of the existing parliamentary system, would be a thing of the 
past.<xen>72</xen> Morris’s argument was consistent with his earlier rejection of 
representative democracy as a system of class rule,<xen>73</xen> but it suggested that 
majorities could never injure minorities once class divisions based on private ownership had 
been abolished. As Morris put it, ‘community cannot compel the community’.<xen>74</xen> 
This very Rousseauean view meant that individuals would be expected to identify with a 
higher authority, even while their opinions were being trampled on or ignored.<xen>75</xen> 
Morris’s unqualified defence of simple majoritarianism, let alone his assumption of universal 
class interest certainly put him at odds with a good proportion of anarchists, communists and 
individualists alike.<xen>76</xen> He was probably right to think that his proposal for a 
central defensive body would alarm all sorts of anarchists, ever mindful of the potential for 
the state’s reconstitution. However, his claim the anarchist rejection of ‘the tyranny of 
society’ meant ‘that every man should be quite independent of every other’<xen>77</xen> – 
as he phrased the critique in News From Nowhere – wrongly assumed that the rejection of 
these two models of decision-making exhausted the possibilities of radical democracy. This 
assumption was faulty because it overlooked the possibility of stepping between the tyranny 
of class interest and moral individualism, even though his own work contained an outline 
model of a non-tyrannous democratic system. Indeed, he fleshed out the point in News From 
Nowhere, where he again discussed the building of a bridge.<xen>78</xen> 
In his second hypothetical context, disagreements about the proposal are resolved through 
dialogue and a continuous process of direct, open balloting, neither by the submission of the 
minority to majority interests, nor by the recognition of the common good. In this picture of 
communism, agreement is reached through a deliberative process, supported by ordinary 
tyranny, capable of determining policy outcomes through the resolution rather than the 
subordination of differences. Morris fleshed out a similar process of consensual and 
deliberative debate in Commonweal. Assuming that ‘a dozen thoughtful men’ would have 
‘twelve different opinions’ on ‘any subject which is not a dry matter of fact’, he argued that 
the group would negotiate a compromise to ‘get their business done’. Morris described the 
‘common rule of conduct’ that underpinned this process as a ‘common bond’ of ‘authority’. 
In this context, however, ‘authority’ referred only to the background concept of tyranny, 
which he believed essential to any society, not the positive commitment to the common good 
– or class interest – that he subsequently adopted to distinguish his brand of communism 
from the individualism of the anarchists.<xen>79</xen> 
Having developed a model of decision-making which assumed that individuals might reach 
voluntary agreement through open discussion and consensus, Morris shifted his position 
when it came to distinguishing communism from anarchism. When it came to pinpointing the 
anarchism’s ideological distinctiveness, agreement appeared to require more than the 
observance of moral norms and respect for individual autonomy (tyranny and mastership), 
which were the only conditions for consensus. In addition, it demanded the enforcement of 
majority rule (the relocation of mastership from individuals to the group) or, even more 
stringently, the recognition of a universal interest (the institutionalisation of mastership as an 
abstract idea). The elision of ordinary tyranny with majoritarianism substantiated Morris’s 
claim that anarchists were individualists, but the integrity of his consensual alternative was 
the price he paid. 
One way of thinking about the alternatives Morris explored is to return to his understanding 
of mastery and art. His conception of anarchist anti-authoritarianism pointed to egotism, or a 
form of competitive, vain-glorious mastership which was consciously transgressive. Against 
this, he posited a defence of majoritarianism and universal interest. This mapped onto an idea 
of mastership which subordinated the interests of individual artists to the well-being of the 
community. A third possibility, one that he sidelined in his late critique of anarchism, was 
outlined in News From Nowhere. It suggested that creativity was primary but that the 
pleasure artists derived from their production was linked to its reception in the wider 
community. This assumed the existence of social tyranny, but one that was shaped by the 
expression of individual wills. 
Conclusion 
Morris’s rejection of anarchism was fuelled by his frustrations with the Socialist League and 
the political violence of the early 1890s. It can be explained by the refusal to accept 
compromise on parliamenatary action – and perhaps the discomfort Morris felt in adopting a 
strategy that he knew to be flawed. His concerns about anarchist individualism were informed 
by principles of fellowship, mastership and tyranny which derived from deeply-held 
convictions about social relations in communism, but his critique depended on reductive 
ideological labelling which smothered the politics of the anarchist movement. Morris’s 
critique of anarchist individualism succeeded when couched in terms of ‘anti-
authoritarianism’, but the costs of success were high: his discussion of decision-making and 
collective agreement was not easily reconciled with the idea of mastership he sought to 
defend. Anarchists might have found aspects of Morris’s communism troubling. But his 
attempts to dismiss anarchism as individualistic by showing that it was wholly incompatible 
with it, failed. 
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